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1. Land acquisition in India, past and present 
  Since the times when meek sheep devoured men to the present day, expropriation of farmers’ 
lands, and the diversion of agricultural lands into use for other industries have been the most violent tur-
moil in the age of industrial transformation. Marxist would call this historical process as “primitive accu-
mulation.”
 Right from the colonial days, the Indian state had recourse to the principle of “eminent domain” 
and enacted Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (LAA in short) for public acquisition of land properties. When 
imperial capital was shifted from Calcutta to Delhi in 1911, it was with the force of this law that Britishers 
built a grand new capital over the vast farmlands.
 An Anglo-American legal lexicon defines “Eminent domain” as;
 “Right to acquisition, public acquisition, expropriation; an entitlement and exercise thereof by 
a government or an entity so deemed, of forcibly acquiring the property right of other govern-
ments or private persons.1 ”
  In India, the right of acquisition has been exercised by the Union i.e. the Central government and 
the state governments. The independent India’s Constitution apportions “Land” to the list of State legisla-
tive subjects, while “Property acquisition” is allotted to the list of Concurrent subjects, on which both Cen-
tral and state governments can make laws. Politics of land acquisition thus straddles Union (Central) and 
states administration.
 Although LAA has a section on Hearing of Objections (Section 5A) against state acquisition, Dis-
trict Collectors, the competent authority of land acquisition, have largely dismissed objections on the plea 
of “public purpose.” Post-Independent public projects, including hydro-power reservoirs, irrigation canals, 
highways, and new industrial estates entailed huge scale of evictions, with no consideration to due compen-
sation for life and property.
  It wasn’t until late 1980s that state action was called into question. First major protest was initiated 
by a movement against a dam construction over the Narmada River in central India. Narmada Bachao An-
dolan (NBA, Save Narmada Movement) was led by a woman social activist, Medha Patkar.
 Later in the 1990s, economic liberalization policy initiated by the Indian National Congress (INC) 
party in 1991 boosted demand for lands not only by public entities, but also by private enterprises. 
  In 2006 Union and state governments launched Special Economic Zone (SEZ) program which in-
1 Tanaka, Hideo (ed.) Dictionary of Anglo American Law (in Japanese), Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1991, pp. 292-3.
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volved acquisition on much larger scale to accommodate estates for information technology, energy, infra-
structure and multi-purpose projects. In the urban neighborhoods, greedy estate dealers, in collusion with 
the local politicians, bought at concessionary price or simply usurped large chunks of state-acquired lands 
which, once developed, brought them exorbitant profits. 
 Land Conflicts Watch (LCW), a vigilante journalists’ organization reports that currently in India 
there are 537 disputes relating to land acquisition, involving 7,338,232 people and 2,143,119 ha of lands 
(21,432 ㎢ , 0.65% of total area of the country and a bit larger than Shikoku Island in Japan)2. 
 LCW classifies sources of disputes into six categories; industry, infrastructure, land use, mining, 
power and protected areas. At the turn of the century, India apparently needed a law to enforce fair and 
due process for public land acquisition.
 Against this backdrop, a land dispute over a car factory project of the Tata Motors Ltd. (TML) in 
West Bengal worked as catalyst for a new legislation.
2. A land dispute that blew up the Left-Front government in West 
Bengal
 It all started with an announcement in June 2006 by the West Bengal government that it intended 
to set up TML’s One Lakh (100 thousand) Rupee Small Car factory in Singur Thana (County) in Hoogly 
District, some 30 km NE of Calcutta city.
 The then state government led by the Left Front coalition, with the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) (CPI-M) being a dominant partner, had just emerged victorious in May state assembly elec-
tions. This was their seventh consecutive win since 1977. The government largely supported by rural elec-
torate with its successful tenancy reforms and vigorous input in agricultural production, sought to reorient 
economic policy toward more industrialization to provide jobs and alleviate massive unemployment. 
 Despite the economic rationale behind the policy, decision was rather hasty. 90 per cent of the 
proposed 997 acres (400 ha) site was a single-crop farm land and the remaining 10 per cent was rich dou-
ble-cropping field. Agitation against acquisition started in October with local general strikes and demon-
strations. It was led by the Trinamul (Grass-root) Congress (TC), a splinter party from the INC and the 
dominant opposition in the state.
  The state government through the agency of West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation 
(WBIDC) sped up the process and started paying compensation in December. Farmers and TC stood firm 
with their newly formed “Committee to Save Farm Lands (Krishi Bhumi Raksha Committee)”. Rich farm-
ers who invested in tube-wells found state compensation highly inadequate while poor agricultural work-
ers losing jobs got no compensation. In December 2006 site was transferred to the TML, and after a suit in 
High Court lost in 2007, a violent phase started. The Committee resorted to physical obstruction. In return 
TML started removing machines and other equipment from January 2008 and finally declared withdrawal 
on the 3rd October 2008 (meanwhile the TML sought another location in Gujarat).
 West Bengal at the same time was hit with another land dispute in the East Midnapore District. A 
petrochemical SEZ was planned in Nandigram Thana of the district and was fiercely opposed by the local 
people. In July 2007 fourteen people were fatally shot by the police and the state government had to con-
cede their high-handedness in dealing with the SEZ turmoil.
 The twin incidents of Singur and Nandigram testified to the crucial importance of land acquisition 
2 http://landconflictswatch, retrieved on Dec. 25, 2017.
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in promoting industrialization, but grass-root party conflicts deeply embedded in West Bengal rural poli-
tics also aggravated the relation between state government and farmers3. In the Assembly elections held in 
May 2011, Left Front was defeated by the TC and 34 years of left rule in West Bengal came to an end4. 
 Lesson was obvious. Colonial and obsolete LAA had to be dismantled and (to be) replaced by a 
new comprehensive legislation. This awareness led to a totally remodeled land acquisition act in 2013 un-
der the INC-led coalition called United Progressive Alliance (UPA). Before examining the details of the 
2013 law, the subsequent story of the Tata Car factory is briefly narrated.
3. Narendra Modi of Gujarat intervened
 Four days after the TML announced withdrawal from Singur, TML Chairman Ratan Tata and Gu-
jarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi held a joint press conference and declared Nano factory to be relocat-
ed to Sanand in Gujarat.
 Modi was then stigmatized as a Hindu communalist for his role in the anti-Muslim pogrom in the 
early 2002. He expected that the invitation to Tata would improve his image as a pro-business performer5. 
Factory was completed within fourteen months and the first assembled car came out in June 2010.
Extraordinary was not only the Modi government’s swift action but the bountiful agreement of the state 
government with the TML. Agreement remained out of public eyes for several years only to be disclosed 
four years later by investigative journalists6. 
・  Government offered one thousand acres of farmlands in Sanand (almost similar in size to the Sin-
gur factory site) with additional hundred acres for a township near Ahmedabad.
・  Acquisition was announced on the 4th December 2009. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpora-
tion put the price at four times the market price which it sold TML at 3.6 million rupees per acre. 
Total cost for land amounted to four billion Rupees which TML was to pay in eight installments at 
8 percent interest. Whereas in West Bengal, land was leased for 90 years at the annual rent of ten 
million rupees for the first year, with staged increase over 90 years.
・	 Government assured over 20 years a 95 billion Rupees loan with 0.1% interest, against TML’s total 
investment of 20 billion Rupees. West Bengal government offered only a 2 billion Rupee soft loan. 
This was the most generous part of the Gujarat offer, as it offered in the case of Ford Motors, 
only 280 million Rupees loan with 10 % interest.
3 West Bengal rural politics is highly politicized in the sense that among 240 members of the lowest strata of representa-
tive council, i.e. Gram Panchayats in Singur Block, only 4 were independents, whereas Trinamul Congress had 147 and 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) had 70 members. (http://www.wbsec.gov.in/(S(k4h01355jkwxa445utzspa2h))/
FinalResult/FinalResult _gp_2013.aspx)
4 The suit for recovering Singur lands continued even afterwards. In August 2016, Supreme Court of India reached a 
verdict that Government didn’t follow the procedure for acquisition laid down in LAA and ordered lands to be returned 
to the owners. One of the two ruling judges declared that Government acquisition of lands for the TML could not be re-
garded as “public purposes” (Kedar Nath Yadav v. Govt of West Bengal, https://www.legallyindia.com/supreme-court/
legally-explained-why-the-sc-struck-down-the-singur-land-acquisition-and-what-it-means-via-mint-20160906-7942).
5 Mukhopadhyay. Nilanjan, Narendra Modi, the man, the times, Chennai: Tanquebar Press, 2013, p. 363; Sardesai, Rajdeep, 
2014 the Election that changed India, Gurgaon: Penguin Books India, 2014, pp.32-3.
6 On Government -TML agreement, see Telegraph (Kolkata), 21 Jan/ 2009; “Lure of public money many times its invest-
ment made Tata shift plant to Gujarat”, 8 Oct. 2013, https://centreleftindia.wordpress.com/2013/10/08/lure-of-free-
public-money-many-times-its-investment-made-tata-shift-nano-plant-to-gujarat-not-modis-newly-created-industrial-
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 ・	 Preferential treatment as regards taxation, cess, electric power, water and sewerage was equal-
ly applied in TML case too.
・	 No commitment on jobs, although local preferential employment is a norm in Gujarat industrial 
policy.
 With the TML coming in, Sanand has become a sort of auto-hub and such major car makers as 
Ford, Peugeot and Maruti started their projects in Gujarat. 
 Modi’s dealing with the TML was much appreciated by business and industry. Consulting agen-
cies’ surveys on deregulation and “ease of doing business” in major Indian states ranked Gujarat high, 
especially in dealing with environment clearance and land acquisition7. It goes without saying that this 
one-size-fits-all approach to the “ease of doing business” ignores the diverse contexts of development 
in different states.
4. Land Acquisition Law of 2013 by UPA government
 Story of the Tata factory illustrated a contrasting picture of acquisition policy and its outcome in 
the two states. It is tempting to think that Gujarat managed better, but the entire process in Gujarat was 
“voiceless” while West Bengal’s alleged “failure” was due to abundant “voice.” What was common in both 
cases was that the public acquisition regime under the colonial law (LAA) had little room for accommo-
dating the“voice” of the farmers and landowners.
 To cope with the recurrent land disputes, the UPA government enacted in 2013 an entirely 
new law on land acquisition, “Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Reha-
bilitation and Resettlement Act (LARR in short)”. The word “Right” is notable, as the act was one of the 
“rights-based” laws the UPA government enacted between 2004 and 2014 (See Table below). On UPA’s 
politics of rights, we shall discuss it later in the concluding part.
 
Table: Rights-based legislation by UPA government (2004-09, 09-14)
• The Right of Information Act 2005
• Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005
• The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009
• The Right of Citizens for Time bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of their 
Grievances Bill 2011
• The National Food Security Act 2013
• The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-
settlement Act 2013
• Lokpal and Lokayukta Act 2013
 LARR has 114 sections in 13 chapters with four schedules, whereas old LAA had only fifty-odd 
clauses. Provisions are related to the whole process of land acquisition, beginning from consent of land 
owners, social impact assessment (SIA), preservation of multi-cropping or irrigated lands, procedure of 
acquisition, resettlement and rehabilitations, and finally to disputes settlement mechanism.
 Most dissatisfying provisions for the business interests were the ones for the need of prior con-
sent and social impact assessment. They opposed LARR, alleging that land acquisition was made practi-
7 Survey of Business Regulatory Environment for Manufacturing - State Level Assessment, Vol. I, Final Report; Vol. II State 
Specific Findings (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, DIPP Home Page, retrieved on 19 June 2015); Best 
Practices to Improve the Business Environment across India. Accenture, May 2014.
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cally impossible due to these safeguards. 
 LARR may look too restrictive, cumbersome and time-consuming, but the practice under the old 
law (LAA) often entailed abuse of “public purpose”, and/or excessive acquisition over the actual need of 
the projects. Safeguards in LARR were designed to make executives more responsive to the rights of land-
owners and make them more circumspect in exercising administrative authority.
 A year after LARR was enacted, India held the 16th Parliamentary (Lower House) elections in 
early 2014. Opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by no other (person) than Narendra Modi, who 
invited TML car factory as the Chief Minister of Gujarat, won a landslide victory over the UPA, with strong 
backing from the business interests.
5. Amendment proposal of 2013 Land Acquisition Law by Modi 
government
  The Modi government set to amend LARR immediately after assuming office. Though BJP had 
comfortable majority in the Lower House, INC kept majority in the Upper House. On the last day of 2014, 
the Modi government issued a Presidential Ordinance to amend LARR, bypassing the parliament.
  The core of the amendment was to exempt safeguard provisions of consent of land owners, social 
impact assessment and preservation of multi-cropped and irrigated agricultural lands, in case acquisition 
was necessitated for five specified purposes. Exemptions are; 
a) national security, defence, any area related with defence production
b) rural infrastructure including electrification
c) affordable housing, housing for the poor
d) industrial corridors by government or related agencies, area within one kilometer of both sides of 
their (corridors’) dedicated railways and roads
e) Public Private Partnership projects (where land rights rest on the government)
 Amendment by the government incidentally kept provisions for price of lands, resettlement or re-
habilitation untouched. Core concern of the government and business was with the safeguards of consent 
and social impact assessment. Making “doing business” easier had been the hallmark of the Modi admin-
istration since his days as Gujarat Chief Minister. With Modi crowned in New Delhi, the “Gujarat model” 
became a national model every state had to emulate.
“With these amendments, the objectives of the 2013 law which was to limit the mechanism of 
forced acquisition has been undermined significantly. ……With this one step the ruling party 
(BJP) had returned us to the days of the British enacted law where our citizens enjoyed no say 
in their development 8 ”
 But the discontents of farmers forced the NDA government to retreat. Farmers’ bodies claimed 
that the five exemptions were so vaguely defined as to allow arbitrary interpretations. In March 2015, Modi 
had to let the presidential ordinance lapse and in the following parliamentary session, presented a bill with 
almost the same content. But this bill is yet to get parliamentary sanction. 
 After an unsuccessful attempt to amend LARR in the Parliament, the NDA government started 
8 Ramesh, Jairam and Muhammad Ali Khan, Legislating for Justice, the making of the 2013 Land Acquisition Law, New 
Delhi Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 128.
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encouraging state governments to amend LARR exactly in the same way as it tried to do (note that states 
have also power to amend “land” laws). BJP-ruled states like Gujarat, Haryana, Goa and Rajasthan quickly 
responded and modified respective land acquisition laws along the lines of the central amendment. 
Conclusion
 The politics of land acquisition so far narrated centered around two interrelated themes; states’ 
varied experiences on land acquisition and contrasting approach toward law reforms on land acquisition 
under two different political combinations; one led by INC and another by BJP. By way of conclusion, we 
will locate the narrative in a wider context of political economy in contemporary India. 
Land, labour and Farmers’ discontent
 First of all, farmers’ dissent has to be understood in connection with specific features of industrial 
transformation in India since the 1990s. Most characteristically the decline of agriculture in national econo-
my has not been accompanied with corresponding decline in rural work force. Seventy percent of the total 
population still remain in rural areas, while agriculture’s share in GDP decreased from 30% to 18% after two 
decades of liberalization. On the other hand, growth in the secondary and tertiary sectors has not been 
so vigorous nor in a way as to absorb fresh work force from the rural areas in large quantity. We do not go 
into details, as the matter needs deeper analysis, but, dim prospect for non-agricultural jobs is certainly 
a factor for farmers’ unwillingness to part with their fragmented and uneconomic holdings. Further, the 
farmers from experience for the last decades learned that the land price soared after acquisition and they 
ended up feeling deprived by the low rate of compensation.
Politics of Rights, a mere political expediency?
 Neo-liberal reforms in India started in early 1990s under the INC rule, and subsequently NDA 
and UPA, two coalitions led by BJP and INC respectively have framed their policy within the neo-liberal 
regime. We have witnessed a sort of “competitive neo-liberalism” in Indian politics. Apparently the case of 
INC’s politics of rights and land acquisition law reform does not fit in this pattern, as the two coalitions sub-
stantially differ in their outlook.
 Our case on land acquisition law reforms poses a question if the difference is only of political ex-
pediency, or if even under the neo-liberal policy regime, space for policy divergence could grow under cer-
tain circumstances, and finally if the rights-based approach offers an alternative to the neo-liberal policy 
regime.
 Further exploration on the land acquisition in contemporary India along these lines will certainly 
enrich our studies on Indian political economy.
